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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
district, presiding out of term or at chambers by consent of the parties.
The question of a resident judge's jurisdiction to decide at chambers
a controversy without action seems to be a new problem. A somewhat
analogous situation arose in the case of Greene v. Stadiem where it was
held that a special judge had no jurisdiction to decide at chambers a
controversy without action when he was not holding a term of court.
This decision was based on a narrow interpretation of G. S. 1-250. It
is this same interpretation that Justice Barnhill argued for in the dissent
of the Indemnity Co. case. G. S. 1-250 allows a controversy without
action to be brought before any court which would have had jurisdic-
tion if an action had been brought. Since G. S. 7-65 confers concur-
rent jurisdiction on the resident judge only in those matters of which
the Superior Court has jurisdiction out of term, and since controversies
without action may be submitted before the regular judge of a district
at chambers or out of term by the consent of the parties, it would seem
that the resident judge would have concurrent jurisdiction; and, ap-
parently, the majority of the court in the Indemnity Co. case so thought
-as nothing whatsoever was mentioned in the opinion as to the juris-
dictional question. However, Justice Barnhill seems to have read G. S.
1-250 as a limitation on G. S. 7-65 so as to leave only the judge who
would have had jurisdiction had the cause been submitted to a jury
the authority to hear it out of term by the consent of the parties.
Justice Barnhill concluded his dissent on the jurisdictional phase
with the thought that the resident judge should be given concurrent
jurisdiction in all matters not requiring the intervention of a jury or
in which trial by jury has been waived. It is submitted that perhaps
that authority is already established, as the majority in the Indemnity
Co. case seemed to think, by a literal reading of G. S. 7-65; but it is
agreed that legislative action definitely settling this problem of over-
lapping jurisdiction would be welcomed by the legal profession.
IDRIENNE E. LEVY.
Damages-Personal Injuries-Reduction to "Present Value" for
Future Injury-Instructions--Appeal and Error
In a recent case' the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the
defendant's truck driver at Pope Field, Fort Bragg, N. C. The fol-
lowing charge was submitted by the trial court relative to the measure
of damages: " . . . if you come to consider that question ( damages)
you have a right to take into consideration the age of the plaintiff at
377 (1934) ; Mitchell v. Board of Education, 201 N. C. 55, 158 S. E. 850 (1931) ;
City of Charlotte v. Shepard, 120 N. C. 411, 27 S. E. 90 (1897) ; Arnold v. Porter,
119 N. C. 123, 25 S. E. 785 (1896); Brem v. Lockhart, 93 N. C. 191 (1885);
Harrell v. Peebles, 79 N. C.-26 (1878) ; Hervey v. Edmunds, 68 N. C. 243 (1873).1Daughtery v. Cline, 224 N. C. 381, 30 S. E. (2d) 322 (1944).
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the time, his physical and mental condition since, resulting from this
accident; his means and ability to engage in useful and gainful occupa-
tion for his livelihood, his ability to make money, and you may take
into consideration the pain he has suffered, the loss of time, the lack
of opportunity to engage in profitable employment or gainful occupa-
tion as a result of this injury. You may consider all these things and
let your answer be in one lump sum, what you think would be a fair
amount to fairly compensate him for his pain and suffering, physical
ills and disabilities ... ; and his reduced earning capacity and inability
to carry on... , and say in one lump sum what would be a fair amount
of award to compensate him for his injuries. ' '2 From an adverse ver-
dict the defendant appealed assigning as error the above quoted in-
struction, contending that the damages for losses which may accrue
in the future were not limited to the present value of such damages.
The court held, by a 5-2 decision, that a new trial should be granted as
the instruction was defective in not limiting recovery for future losses
to their present value. Stacy, C. J., and Winborne, J., dissented, con-
tending that the defendant should have requested an instruction as to
"present value"; that the silence of the defendant, upon being invited
to submit instructions desired, constituted a waiver of his right to
object; and that with liability established, if a new trial is to be ordered,
it should be limited to the issue of damages.
In an action for personal injury it is generally held that damages
may be assessed covering reasonable nursing and medical expenses,3
for mental and physical pain and suffering, past, present, and prospec-
tive,4 for loss of time,5 and for the diminution of future earning ca-
pacity.8 That these items may be considered by the jury in assessing
damages is well settled, but it is equally well settled that in their appli-
cation the trial judge must conform to the rules and specifications pre-
scribed for the proper measure of damages.
In allowing damages for future injury from the original wrong, the
limitation of such recovery to its present value is generally recognized.
7
The reason for this rule is well put in Hill v. Railroads wherein Walker,
J., said that "Something must be allowed because he (plaintiff) is com-
pensated for them (the injuries) before the time when they would
actually be suffered." Again, in the case of Johnson v. Seaboard Air
SId. at 384, 30 S. E. (2d) at 324.
'Williams v. Charles Stores Co., 209 N. C. 591, 184 S. E. 496 (1936).
'Kepler v. Chicago St. P. M. & 0. Ry. Co., 111 Neb. 273, 196 N. W. 161(1923).
'Kirkpatrick v. Crutchfield, 178 N. C. 348, 100 S. E. 602 (1919).8Adskim v. Oregon-Washington Ry. & Nay. Co., 134 Ore. 574, 294 Pac.
605 (1930).
7 McCoRMICK ON DAMAGES (1st ed. 1935) 304 (future earnings) ; 4 SuTHER-
LAND, DAMAGES (4th ed. 1916) §1249.8 180 N. C. 490, 493, 105 S. E. 184, 186 (1920).
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Line Ry. Co.9 the "present worth rule" is justified by the court's state-
ment that "Any other principle . . . would enable a plaintiff to recover
more than could possibly be earned, as no man realizes at once the full
earnings or accumulations of a lifetime." While these various reasons
are given, and the "present worth rule" thereby amplified, its entire
foundation would seem to find support in the universal phrase "money
had presently is more valuable than money to be had in the future." 1°*
PAIN AND SUFFERING
Nevertheless there seems to be a decided conflict as to whether
damages for prospective pain and suffering are to be reduced to their
present value. There is appreciable authority representative of both
positions, but the majority would appear to be against such reduction.1 1
Thus in Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Candler'2 where the reduction of
damages, for future pain and suffering and inconvenience, to present
value was refused, the court very aptly stated: "At the best the allow-
ance is an estimated sum determined by the intelligence and conscience
of the jury, and we are convinced that a jury would be much more
likely to return a just verdict, considering the estimated life as one
single period, than if it should attempt to reach a verdict by dividing
the life into yearly periods, setting down yearly estimates, and then
reducing the estimates to their present value. The arbitrariness and
artificiality of such a method is so apparent that to require a jury to
apply it would be an absurdity." Rather than the "present value rule"
the Candler case, supra, propounds the "reasonable compensation rule,"
the reasonableness of which is to be determined by the jury's observa-
tion, experience, and sense of fairness and right.18 The Pennsylvania
court, in following the "reasonable compensation rule," states that the
jury can easily grasp the meaning of the word "compensation," but
that the words "present worth" would have no meaning whatever to
them.l4 * The rule expounded by the Candler case15 has been adopted
and followed by numerous courts.16 But in the case of Rigley v.
163 N. C. 431, 453, 79 S. E. 690, 699 (1913).
10* MCCORMICK oN DAMAGES (1st ed. 1935) 304 (if a person be allowed his
total diminution of earning capacity, -it ". .. would be more than compensation,
for it would enable the plaintiff to get his future wages long in advance and to
reap interest on the money during the intervening period.") (Italics supplied.).
" NoTEs (1922) 28 A. L. R. 1177, (1930) 77 A. L. R. 1439, 1451.
12283 Fed. 881, 885 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922). 23Ibid.
*McLane v. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 230 Pa. 29, 70 Atl. 237 (1911); accord,
Yost v. W. Penn. Rys. Co., 336 Pa. 407, 410, 9 A. (2d) 368, 369 (1939) (Nor
may damages for future medical expenses be so reduced, as "future medical at-
tention presupposes an out-of-pocket expenditure. . . ."); Bostwick v. Pittsburgh
Ry. Co., 255 Pa. 387, 100 Atl. 123 (1917) (The jury should assess such reason-
able sum as they find from all the evidence and circumstances will fairly com-
pensate the plaintiff.).
"Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Candler, 283 Fed. 881 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922).
"Louisville & N. Ry. Co. v. Maffett, 36 Ga. App. 513, 137 S. E. 404 (1927);
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Pryor17 the Missouri court sustained an instruction limiting recovery
for future pain and suffering to the present worth thereof.' 8 North
Carolina finds its place among those decisions supporting the "present
worth rule." In a fairly recent case, the trial court's instruction to the
jury that ". . . the plaintiff is to have a reasonable compensation ...
for the loss of both bodily and mental powers . . ." was held defective
in that it failed to limit the plaintiff's recovery to the present worth
of a fair and reasonable compensation for his mental and physical pain
and suffering. 19 However, better reason would seem to support the
"reasonable compensation rule," for it is difficult to see how the present
worth of future suffering could be determined since the assessment of
such damages involves, unavoidably, a high degree of speculation.
EARNING CAPACITY
While the application of the "present worth rule" in assessing dam-
ages for prospective pain and suffering is not supported by the weight
of authority, its applicability in measuring damages for impairment of
earning capacity is recognized by the vast majority of the courts. 20
And even though the plaintiff earns the same amount subsequent to the
injury as he was earning before that time, but in a different type of
job, and even though it would be evidence tending to show no impair-
ment of his earning capacity, the jury may consider the work he had
performed, both prior to and since the accident; and if the conclusion
of impairment of earning capacity is justly reached, damages may be
awarded.21 Thus it is generally held that the present value of future
earnings should be computed by determining the plaintiff's life ex-
pectancy,22 taking into consideration his age, condition, station in life,
Southern Ry. Co. v. Bottoms, 35 Ga. App. 804, 134 S. E. 824 (1926); Louisville
& N. Ry. Co. v. Gayle, 204 Ky. 142, 263 S. W. 763 (1924) ; Kepler v. Chicago,
St. P. M. & 0. Ry. Co., 111 Neb. 273, 196 N. W. 161 (1923); Le Van v. McLean,
276 Pa. 361, 120 Atl. 395 (1923).17290 Mo. 10, 233 S. W. 828 (1921).
s Accord, St. Louis L M. & S. R. Co. v. McMichael, 115 Ark. 101, 171 S. W.
115 (1914); Howell v. Lansing City Elec. Ry. Co., 136 Mich. 432, 99 N. W.
406 (1904).
I Shipp v. United Stage Lines, Inc., 192 N. C. 475, 478, 135 S. E. 339, 341(1926).20 Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Carroll, 84 Fed. 772 (C. C. A. 5th, 1898) ; O'Brien
v. White & Co., Inc., 105 Me. 308, 74 AUt. 721 (1909); Culver v. Union Pac.
Ry. Co., 112 Neb. 441, 199 N. W. 794 (1924); Lamont v. Highsmith Hospital,
Inc., 206 N. C. 111, 173 S. E. 46 (1934); Hill v. North Car. Ry. Co. & Dir. Gen.
of Rys., 18Q N. C. 490, 105 S. E. 184 (1920); Kirkpatrick v. Crutchfield, 178
N. C. 348, 100 S .E. 602 (1919) ; Fry v. North Car. Ry. Co., 159 N. C. 357, 74
S. E. 971 (1912); Adskim v. Oregon-Washington Ry. & Nay. Co., 134 Ore. 574,
294 Pac. 605 (1930); Littman v. Bell Tel. of Penn., 315 Pa. 370, 172 At. 687(1934); Bockelcamp v. Lackawanna & W. Va. Ry. Co., 232 Pa. 66, 81 Atl. 93(1911); see, Yost vr. W. Penn. Rys. Co., 336 Pa. 407, 410, 9 A. (2d) 368, 370
(1939).
, Bockelcamp v. Lackawanna & W. Va. Ry. Co., 232 Pa. 66, 81 AUt. 93 (1911).
'2 Lanier v. Palms, 129 Mich. 671, 89 N. W. 694 (1902).
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occupation, health and surroundings.23 And it is well settled that mor-
tuary tables will be received in evidence to -determine such life expec-
tancy,24* which is to be predicated on the condition of the plaintiff at
the time of trial rather than the time prior to the injury.25 From the
time of the injury to the time of trial the plaintiff .may recover for
actual pain, suffering and inconvenience, medical and nursing expenses,
and loss of time; but these items are usually merged in a general re-
covery for permanent injuries.
In stating this rule the courts have used different language. The
court, in Littman v. Bell Tel. Co. of Penn.,2 6 stated: "The award for
permanent impairment of earning power must not exceed, though it
should equal, the worth at the date of the verdict, of a sum which
would be made up by adding the many losses the injured party would
sustain from year to year by reason of such impairment of his ability
to earn money during the reasonably expected duration of his life's
future earning period."2 7  And in Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.
Co.2 8 the court held erroneous an instruction which allowed the jury
to award plaintiff the difference between what he would make with the
injury and what he would have made had he not been injured, saying
that the plaintiff is entitled only to the present value of his diminished
earning power.29* But in the case of Adskim v. Oregon-Washington
Ry. & Nay. Co.30 a different situation is presented. There the jury
was instructed to award an amount which would fully and fairly com-
pensate the plaintiff for his injuries. The defendant appealed asserting
"City of Denver v. Scherret, 88 Fed. 226 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898); Wolf v.
Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co., 236 Pa. 240, 84 AtI. 778 (1912).
2*Powell v. Augusta & S. R. Co., 77 Ga. 192, 3 S. E. 757 (1886); Patton v,
Sanburn, 133 Iowa 650, 110 N. W. 1032 (1907) ; North Texas Const. Co. v. Craw-
ford, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 56, 87 S. W. 233 (1905) ; Waterman v. Chicago & A. R.
Co., 82 Wis. 613, 52 N. W. 247 (1892) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Michie, Sublett
& Stedman, 1943) §8-46 ("Morttiary tables as evidence.-Whenever it is necessary
to establish the expectancy of continued life of any person from any period of
such person's life, whether he be living at the time or not, the table hereto ap-
pended shall be received in all courts and by all persons having' power to deter-
mine litigation, as evidence, with other evidence as to the health, constitution and
habits of such person, of such expectancy represented by the figures in the
columns. . . .") (Italics supplied.), Russell v. Windson Steamboat Co., 126 N. C.
961, 36 S. E. 191 (1900) (The tables should be considered with the other evidence
as to health, constitution and habits of the injured party.), Coley v. Statesville,
121 N. C. 301, 28 S. E. 482 (1897) (Tables are competent as evidence without
being specially put in evidence since they are a public act.).
"
8Hughes v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 150 Iowa 232, 129 N. W. 956 (1911)
Howell v. Lansing City Elec. Co., 136 Mich. 432, 99 N. W. 406 (1904); Webb
v. Omaha & S. I. Ry. Co., 101 Neb. 596, 164 N. W. 564 (1917).
28315 Pa. 370, 172 Atl. 287 (1934.).27Id. at 377, 172 Atl. at 690.
28 163 N. C. 431, 79 S. E. 690 (1913).
2*'Accord, Kilpatrick v. Kinston Mfg. Co., 175 N. C. 201, 95 S. E. 168 (1918)
(For partial loss of earning power a person is only entitled to the present value
of his diminished earning power in the future.); Fry v. N. C. Ry. Co., 159 N. C.
357, 74 S. E. 971 (1912).
20 134 Ore. 574, 294 Pac. 605 (1930).
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that the charge should have included the "present value rule," but the
court held that the amount awarded by the jury was less than the pres-
ent value of the -diminished earning capacity, and that since the de-
fendant was not prejudiced the verdict would stand. The Oregon
court's decision represents a very commendable attitude, and would
appear to facilitate the administration of justice. However, North
Carolina adheres strictly to the "present value rule" as to both future
pain and suffering and impairment of future earning capacity 31
With the "present value rule" established and followed, the further
question arises concerning the duty of the court to instruct the jury as
to the application of the rule. While the failure of the court to instruct
as to this rule, without having been requested to do so by the defendant,
has in a number of cases been held reversible error,32 there are a few
decisions, while recognizing and approving the rule, which hold this
omission to be harmless error.33
It has been observed, however, that "The most common ground for
refusing relief on appeal, from a verdict rendered in the absence of
a charge limiting recovery for loss of future benefit to present worth, is
the failure of counsel for the defendant to request such an instruction,
the general instruction being correct, and, hence, the error being one
of non-direction rather than mis-direction. '3 4 Upon this observation
was based the chief contention in the argument of the dissent in the
principal case, 35 which finds strong support among the cases.3 6 Thus
"Taylor v. J. A. Jones Const. Co., 193 N. C. 775, 138 S. E. 129 (1927);
Shipp v. United Stage Lines, Inc., 192 N. C. 475, 135 S. E. 339 (1926); Kil-
patrick v. Kinston Mfg. Co., 175 N. C. 201, 95 S. E. 168 (1918).
32 Central of Geo. Ry. Co. v. Goens, 30 Ga. App. 770, 119 S. E. 669 (1923)
(death action under the Fed. Employer's Liability Act); Chesapeake & 0. Ry.
Co. v. Dixon, 212 Ky. 738, 280 S. W. 93 (1926) (action for personal injury under
the Fed. Employer's Liability Act); O'Brien v. Loeb, 229 Mich. 405, 201 N. W.
488 (1924) (personal injury action) ; Stunks v. Payne, 184 N. C. 582, 114 S. E.
840 (1922) (death action under the Fed. Employer's Liability Act); Wilkinson
v. North East, 215 Pa. 486, 64 Atl. 734 (1905) (personal injury action).
"Louisville & N. Ry. Co. v. Morris, 179 Ala. 239, 60 So. 933 (1912) (The
rule should not be treated as a hard and fast one.) ; McKaffrey v. Schwartz, 284
Pa. 561, 132 Atl. 810 (1926) (Omission would result in only a slight inade-
quacy.); Maloney v. Wisconsin Power, Light & Heat Co., 180 Wis. 546, 193 N.
W. 399 (1923) (Court's instructions were substantially correct.).
SNoam (1930) 77 A. L. R. 1439, 1459.
"
3 See, Daughtery v. Cline, 224 N. C. 381, 388, 30 S. E. (2d) 322, 326 (1944)(dissenting opinion).
" Louis. & Nash. Ry. Co. v. Holloway, 246 U. S. 525, 38 Sup. Ct. 379, 62 L.
ed. 867 (1918); St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. McMichael, 115 Ark. 101, 171
S. W. 115 (1914); Cuthbertson v. Hoffa, 205 Iowa 666, 216 N. W. 733 (1927);
Greenway v. Taylor County, 144 Iowa 332, 112 N. W. 943 (1909); Clark v.
Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 318 Mo. 453, 300 S. W. 758 (1927) ; Bourke v. Butte
Elec. & Power Co., 33 Mont. 267, 83 Pac. 470 (1905) ; Kennedy v. Telegraph Co.,
201 N. C. 756, 161 S. E. 389 (1931); Dulin v. Henderson-Gilmer Co., 192 N. C.
638, 135 S. E. 614 (1926) ; Murphy v. Suncrest Lumber Co., 186 N. C. 746, 120
S. E. 342 (1923); Hill v. N. C. Ry. Co., 180 N. C. 490, 105 S. E. 184 (1920);
Harris v. Turner, 179 N. C. 322, 102 S. E. 502 (1920) (Plaintiff sues for back
wages and defendant counterclaims in debt.); Futch v. Atl. Coast Line Ry. Co.,
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we see in the case of Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Holloway,37
where the administrator of the decedent brought a death action against
the railroad, the court instructed the jury, in effect, that the plaintiff
was entitled to recover such an amount as would fairly and reasonably
compensate the widow. This instruction was held to be generally cor-
rect, and the court stated that the defendant should have requested in-
structions as to reduction to present value.3S* And in the case of St.
Louis L M. & S. Ry. Co. v. McMichael39 the defendant complained on
appeal that the "present value rule" was not included in the instruc-
tions. But the court there held that since defendant tendered no re-
quest, after being specifically invited to do so by the court, he was not
prejudiced and the instruction would stand.40 North Carolina would
seem to take its place among these -decisions, upholding the proposition
that while the charge is generally correct, though not as definite and
full as it might have been, had the "present value rule" been instructed,
if the defendant desired a more elaborate statement, he should have re-
quested it.41 The case which seemingly pioneered this rule in our state
as to personal injuries is Hill v. North Carolina Ry. Co. & Dir. Gen. of
Rys.,42 where the plaintiff sued for personal injuries received due to the
negligence of the defendant. On appeal the defendant asserted omission
to charge the "present value rule" below. But the court held, while
recognizing the correctness of the "present value rule," that the charge
did not completely ignore the rule and that "if the defendant desired it
to be stated more fully . . . he should himself have asked for an in-
struction sufficient to present his view.. . ,,43 In Murphy v. Suncrest
178 N. C. 282, 100 S. E. 436 (1919) (suit in contract) ; State v. Yellowday, 152
N. C. 793, 67 S. E. 480 (1910) (Defendant convicted for unlawfully entering the
land of another.) ; Davis v. Keen, 142 N. C. 496, 55 S. E. 359 (1906) (action to
set aside a sale for fraud); McKaffry v. Schwartz, 284 Pa. 561, 132 Atl. 810
(1926); El Paso Elec. Ry. Co. v. Kitt, 9P S. W. 587 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907);
McAfee v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 62 Utah 115, 218 Pac. 98 (1923).
246 U. S. 525, 38 Sup. Ct. 379, 62 L. ed. 867 (1918).
"* Accord, Cuthbertson v. Hoffa, 205 Iowa 666, 216 N. W. 733 (1927) (Ap-
pellant is in no position to complain because request was not made for a more
certain and complete instruction concerning present worth.) ; Greenway v. Taylor
County, 144 Iowa 322, 122 N. W. 943 (1909) (It may well be assumed that thejurors appreciated, without explicit explanation, that they were to estimate the
present value of the future earnings lost by the injured party.); El Paso Elec.
Ry. Co. v. Kitt, 99 S. W. 587 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907) (Explanation of the rule, if
desired, should have been requested.).
30 115 Ark. 101, 171 S. W. 115 (1914).
'Accord, Clark v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 318 Mo. 453, 300 S. W. 758
(1927); McAfee v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 62 Utah 115, 218. Pac. 98
(1923) (Partial noninstruction, or omission to charge as to a particular isssue,
does not constitute reversible error*in absence of a specific request for a more
comprehensive instruction.).
"'Kennedy v. Telegraph Co., 201 N. C. 756, 161 S. E.'389 (1931) ; Dulin v.
Henderson-Gilmer Co., 192 N. C. 638, 135 S. E. 614 (1926); Murphy v. Lumber
Co., 186 N. C. 746, 120 S. E. 342 (1923) ; Hill v. N. C. Ry. Co., 180 N. C. 490,
105 S. E. 184 (1920).
,2 180 N. C. 490, 105 S. E. 184 (1920). "Id. at 493, 105 S. E. at 186.
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Lumber Co.4 4 the trial judge charged the jury ". . . the injured party
is entitled to be awarded and to recover such an amount as will rea-
sonably compensate him for his loss sustained, past, present and in the
future. . . . Such losses may embrace actual expenses for medical
care and attention .. . ; they likewise may include the ... impairing
of the ability of the injured person to perform labor .... -45 The court
held that the "present worth rule" was not altogether ignored in this
instruction, although it was not stated as fully as it might have been,
and that it was incumbent upon the defendant to ask for a fuller state-
ment if he desired it. The rule of these cases has been further amplified
in this jurisdiction, and would appear to have been established as a
fixed and settled doctrine.46
Upon examination of the principal case,47 it would appear that the
majority disregarded the Hill and Murphy cases, supra, as argued by
the dissenting judges. The trial judge specifically inquired of counsel:
"Gentlemen, are there any prayers or instructions or anything you care
to have me give in the charge?"; but there was no response. 4& The
instruction given in this case was substantially that given in the Murphy
case. 49 Certainly it cannot be seriously contended that the twice re-
peated expression ".... let your answer be in one lump sum. . .5 was
not capable of the interpretation, and not intended to be interpreted, to
mean "a cash settlement of plaintiff's injuries, past, present and pro-
spective." 5' 1 On the basis of the above decisions, it would seem that
the charge in the principal case states correctly the general principles
of law, and that the defendant has waived his right to complain, not
having requested an instruction as to present value when invited to do
so by the trial court.
It would also appear reasonable and just that if a new trial is to
be awarded, it should be awarded to the damages question alone; and
that the issue of negligence be considered res adjudicata. "If there
are several issues which are separable, the court may, for error found,
direct a new trial to be had upon one or more of the issues, and allow
the verdict to stand as to the others .... ,"52 This is supported by over-
whelming authority. 53 There are cases which flatly refuse to recognize
"186 N. C. 746, 120 S. E. 342 (1923).
"Id. at 748, 120 S. E. at 343.
"Kennedy v. Telegraph Co., 201 N. C. 756, 161 S. E. 389 (1931); Dulin v.
Henderson-Gilmer Co., 192 N. C. 638, 135 S. E. 613 (1926).
' Daughtery v. Cline, 224 N. C. 381, 30 S. E. (2d) 322 (1944).
'8Id. at 355, 30 S. E. (2d) at 326.
" Murphy v. Lumber Co., 186 N. C. 746, 120 S. E. 342 (1923).
oDaughtery v. Cline, 224 N. C. 381, 384, 30 S. E. (2d) 322, 324 (1944).1Id. at 389, 30 S. E. (2d) at 327.
'MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 805.
"Swann-Day Lumber Co. v. Cornett, 161 Ky. 98, 170 S. W. 516 (1914);
Faulkner v. Middleton, 186 Miss. 355, 188 So. 565 (1939); McLaughlin v. R. W.
Fagan-Peel Co., 125 Miss. 116, 87 So. 471 (1921); White v. McRee, 111 Miss.
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this equitable solution.54* It must clearly appear that the matter, in
regard to which efror has been committed, is entirely distinct and
separate from the matters involved in the other issues, and that the
new trial can be had without -danger of complications as to these other
matters.5s* Therefore in the case under consideration, the negligence
of the defendant being settled, the issue as to the measure of damages
is not so closely allied to those of negligence and contributory negligence
as to require a new trial of the entire case. Had the new trial been
limited to damages much expense and time of the court, the parties,
counsel and witnesses would have been avoided.
JAMES G. HuDsoN, JR.
Legitimation-Bastardy-Effect on Right of Inheritance of Legiti-
mated Child by Subsequent Matriage of Bastard's Parents
In an action brought by the assignee of a granddaughter of an
intestate against his administrators to recover a sum alleged to be due
the granddaughter, as the balance of her share in her grandfather's
estate, a recent Georgia case' held that the granddaughter, born out
of wedlock, was made legitimate for all purposes by the subsequent
marriage of her father and mother and the recognition of the child by
the father as his own, and was entitled to inherit from her grandfather
through her father.
Plaintiff contended that the right of inheritance by the grand-
daughter rested on two Georgia statutes: (1) " * * * The marriage of
the mother and reputed father of an illegitimate child, and the recog-
nition of such child as his, shall render the child legitimate; and in
502, 71 So. 804 (1916); Borough Const. Co. v. City of New York, 200 N. Y.
149, 93 N. E. 480 (1910) ; Pinnix v. L. A. Smithdeal, 182 N. C. 410, 109 S. E. 265(1921) ; Jones v. Insurance Co. of Va., 153 N. C. 388, 69 S. E. 266 (1910) ; Rush-
ing v. Railroad, 149 N. C. 158, 62 S. E. 890 (1908); Tillett v. Ry. Co., 115 N. C.
616, 23 S. E. 264 (1895); see, Fry v. N. C. Ry. Co., 159 N. C. 357, 366, 74 S.
E. 971, 975 (1912) (dissenting opinion).
"* Torr v. United Rys. of San Francisco, 187 Cal. 505, 202 Pac. 671 (1922)
(Where the verdict for personal injuries is inadequate, the appellate court cannot
merely reverse that portion of the judgment fixing the amount and affirm that
portion fixing the liability of the defendant; but the entire case must be retried.).
"* Rushing Y. Railroad, 149 N. C. 158, 62 S. E. 890 (1908) ; accord, Dean v.
Bridges, 260 App. Div. 48, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 747 (1st Dept., 1940) (Where trial
court rendered verdict for plaintiff for malicious prosecution and false imprison-
ment, there being no separation of damages with respect to the causes of action,
it was held, that if the recovery could not be sustained as to one of these there
must be a reversal as to the entire judgment.); Morrell v. Lallonde, 45 R. I.
112, 120 Atl. 435 (1923) (The question of damages is so closely connected with
and so dependant upon the findings- of facts in issue, that it is impossible to try
the case fairly without presenting it entirely to the jury.) ; Olsen v. Brown, 186
Wis. 179, 202 N. W. 167 (1925) (The perverseness of the jury manifested as to
the question of damages might well have extended to affect the question of the
contributory negligence; thus a new trial should be awarded as to all the issues
involved.).
'Morris v. Dilbeck et al., - Ga. -, 31 S. E. (2d) 93 (1944).
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